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Abstract 
The literature on transnational regulatory networks identified 
interdependence as their main rationale, downplaying domestic factors. 
Typically, relevant contributions use the word “network” only 
metaphorically. Yet, informal ties between regulators constitute 
networked structures of collaboration, which can be measured and 
explained. Regulators choose their frequent, regular network partners. 
What explains those choices? This article develops an Exponential 
Random Graph Model of the network of European national energy 
regulators to identify the drivers of informal regulatory networking. 
The results show that regulators tend to network with peers who 
regulate similarly organised market structures. Geography and 
European policy frameworks also play a role. Overall, the British 
regulator is significantly more active and influential than its peers, and 
a divide emerges between regulators from EU-15 and others. Therefore, 
formal frameworks of cooperation (i.e. a European Agency) were 
probably necessary to foster regulatory coordination across the EU. 
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Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, the literature on transnational regulatory networks (Raustiala 
2002; Slaughter 2004; Slaughter and Zaring 2006; Berg and Horrall 2008; Verdier 
2009; Zaring 2009; Ahdieh 2010; Newman and Zaring 2013) and on European 
Regulatory Networks (Eberlein and Grande 2005; Coen and Thatcher 2008; 
Kelemen and Tarrant 2011; Maggetti and Gilardi 2011; Thatcher 2011; Van 
Boetzelaer and Princen 2012; Maggetti 2013; Blauberger and Rittberger 2015; 
Mathieu 2016) has literally boomed. The pervasiveness of informal networks in 
policy and politics has fuelled academic investigation about their origins, their 
functioning and their effectiveness. Comparatively less research has focussed, 
however, on the inner side of network collaboration. What are the  criteria  
according to which regulators choose whom to network with? In other words, what 
are  the  drivers  of  regulatory  networking?  This  article  answers  this  question by 
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analysing network ties among National Energy Regulatory Authorities from the EU 
Member States. 
The governance literature has converged on the overarching understanding that 
transnational (or transgovernmental) networks are meant to improve the gov- 
ernance of economic sectors or phenomena, whose reach extends beyond  any single 
country. Within networks, regulators have the opportunity to exchange information 
and to coordinate their regulatory practices in order to facilitate cross- border trade 
and investment. These conclusions resonate with the stances of the liberal school of 
international relations (Keohane and Nye 1974; Keohane 1998), which has 
emphasised how increased interdependence motivates transnational cooperation and 
coordination, leading to the creation  of international  regimes (Haas 1980; Keohane 
1982). In this view, regulators network transnationally in order to tackle the 
challenges of interdependence while reaping the opportunities. Beyond 
interdependence, the drivers of regulatory networking have rarely been investigated. 
Recent explanations have pointed to the importance of autonomy and resources in 
prompting regulators to network transnationally (Vestlund 2015; Bach et al. 2016). 
Moreover, existing literature usually employs the word “network” as a useful 
descriptive metaphor, but rarely studies it as a relational structure (Isett et al. 2011). 
Yet, the real thrust of networks resides in the connections between the nodes 
forming them. Regulators maintain informal network ties with peers from other 
countries because they find it worthwhile. Even when semiformal networked 
organisations (such as European Regulatory Networks) exist, individual regulators 
are unlikely to maintain regular bilateral ties with each and every one of their peers; 
more plausibly, they sustain bilateral frequent ties with a subset of peers, reaching 
out to others more sporadically. 
In this article, I investigate the drivers of regulatory networking by analysing the 
directed network of connections between the 28 National Energy Regulatory 
Authorities of EU Member States, plus Norway. I develop an Exponential Random 
Graph Model (ERGM) premised on hypotheses aimed at testing whether the 
structure of the energy sector (in electricity and gas) at national level holds rele- 
vance for explaining the structure of the informal network of the collaboration of 
European energy regulators. In doing so, I rely on the theoretical link between 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hancké et al. 2007) and 
regulatory arrangements in network industries and hypothesise that regulators 
network more with peers who oversee similarly organised markets. 
The results of the analysis show that regulators are, indeed, homophilous in their 
tie choices. Namely, this study finds that similarity in the structure of the energy 
sector across countries is a powerful determinant of network ties for some clusters 
of regulators. Moreover, the British regulator emerges, all else equal, as considerably 
more active and influential than its peers, and a divide is observable between 
regulators from EU-15 countries and others. The results of the model also indicate 
that more resourceful regulators are both more active and more popular networkers, 
contradicting the expectation that regulators with lower (budgetary and staff) res- 
ources use their informal collaboration network to compensate for this lack by 
having more outgoing links than their more resourceful peers. 
Overall, these results lend support to contributions underlining the importance   
of expertise-driven policy learning as the driving force behind transnational reg- 
ulatory networking. Although comembership in EU policy initiatives and trans- 
national flows of electricity and/or gas partially explain network structure, the 
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similarity in energy sector structure is associated with much higher odds of tie 
existence. However, the homophily effect is strongest for newer Member States, 
suggesting they form a rather detached clique from the core of the network. If 
placed in the context of European energy market integration, this result suggests  
that the establishment of a European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) was probably necessary to compel EU energy regulators to 
coordinate with and learn from all of their counterparts, as well as to spur con- 
vergence across the whole EU. 
 
The determinants of network ties: literature review and hypotheses 
The structures of interconnection among a set of nodes can be measured and 
explained using Social Network Analysis (SNA). The usage of SNA for transna- 
tional or national networks of civil servants or other regulatory officials  has 
recently made inroads into the social sciences, as shown by the growing number of 
contributions employing the technique (Alcañiz 2010; Cranmer and Desmarais 
2011; Ingold et al. 2013; Maggetti et al. 2013; Alcañiz 2016a; Boehmke et al. 2016; 
Cranmer et al. 2017; Lazega et al. 2017). 
Scholars have conceptualised transnational regulatory networks as the func- 
tional response to economic interdependence. Networks have been shown to affect 
rule adoption across countries (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011; Maggetti and Gilardi 
2014) via a process of regulatory coordination at the supranational level. Socio- 
logical perspectives have conceptualised networks as arenas where regulators can 
exchange information, opinions and experiences, and therefore learn from each 
other (Majone 1997; Humphreys and Simpson 2008; Sabel and Zeitlin 2008; 
Bianculli 2013). In a policy learning perspective, networked cooperation that is 
sustained over time enables regulators to experiment with the outcomes of their 
collaboration, to conceive new approaches to old and new problems (Sabel and 
Zeitlin 2012). 
More recently, the literature has complemented these understandings with 
perspectives emphasising the importance of domestic determinants for explaining 
transnational networking (Bach and Newman 2014). In particular, contributors 
have highlighted the strategic use that regulators make of their networks to achieve 
more autonomy from the government (Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014; Ruffing 
2015) by exploiting the informational advantages deriving from transnational 
networking (Eberlein and Grande 2005; Jordana 2017). In addition, regulators 
appear to pool resources through networking, thereby compensating for those they 
lack (Alcañiz 2010; Vestlund 2015). 
However, the literature has, thus far, overlooked the rationales explaining reg- 
ulators’ choices regarding their network connections. Regulators maintain infor- 
mal, bilateral network ties because they find it worthwhile. Presumably, however, 
resource and time constraints prevent regulators from being able to  maintain  
regular communication with all of their counterparts; more plausibly, they choose 
their strong ties. Analyses of the motivations for these choices are, however, 
lacking. Filling this gap requires close-up observation and analysis of the ties that 
each regulator has within a network, as this would allow for a clearer grasp of the 
aims of regulatory networking. 
In this article, I use original network data gathered through email and phone 
inquiries from all 28 energy regulatory authorities of EU Member States, plus 
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Norway.1 Their self-reported bilateral ties constitute a network structure.  The  
model developed in this article is aimed at explaining that structure. The literature 
on European Regulatory Networks (key contributions include Coen and Thatcher 
2008; Eberlein and Newman 2008; Kelemen and Tarrant 2011; Levi-Faur 2011; 
Maggetti and Gilardi 2011) and more generally on networks of regulators of 
network industries has, thus far, scarcely relied on the richness of insight that 
network theory and network analysis could afford it. In other words, the literature 
has often used the term “network” without using the methods pertaining to the 
quantitative analysis of networks. 
There are notable exceptions: several contributions have used measurements 
derived from network analysis in order to quantify the influence and reputation of 
different bureaucratic and political actors in the Swiss telecommunication sector 
(Ingold et al. 2013), or the independence and accountability of different regulatory 
authorities (Maggetti et al. 2013). Few contributions, however, have investigated  
the explanatory factors of the relational structure connecting the members of a 
network. The mere existence of semi-formalised frameworks of cooperation, such  
as European Regulatory Networks, offers no insight into the drivers of informal 
bilateral ties among regulators. Yet, the importance of transgovernmental net- 
working for the shaping of EU energy policy, in particular, can hardly be over- 
looked (Eberlein 2008; Kaiser 2009). 
Recent contributions have argued that the “VoC” framework holds explanatory 
power with regard to market and regulatory arrangements in national network 
industries (Thatcher 2007; Guardiancich and Guidi 2016). The VoC framework 
subdivides countries that are members of the Organization for Economic Coop- 
eration and Development (OECD) according to “the way in which firms resolve the 
coordination problems they face” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 7) in the country where 
they operate. The two main types of VoC are Coordinated and Liberal Market 
Economies (CMEs and LMEs). In LMEs, firms predominantly coordinate their 
activities via markets. In CMEs, firms rely more heavily on relational modes of 
coordination with other actors in the political economy  than on market signals.      
In Continental Europe, CMEs are the majority. The only European countries 
classified as LMEs are the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland (Hall and Gingerich 
2009). CMEs have been further differentiated: Scandinavian countries appear to 
have a specific type of social-democracy, different from the coordinated economies 
of Germany (the only pure CME), Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. Southern 
European countries (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal) have been defined as  
“mixed” (or “Mediterranean”) economies (MMEs), where coordination (or lack 
thereof) coexists with an interventionist and compensating state. 
Thatcher (2007) studies the interplay between the VoC framework and reg- 
ulatory institutions in network industries in the cases of the UK, France and 
Germany. He asserts that the EU legislative and regulatory framework for network 
industries, being premised on the goal to foster market competition in the energy 
sector through the introduction of private capital, cost-reflective pricing, market 
 
1I have included the energy regulatory authority of Norway in this analysis because the regulatory 
authority is a member of the Council of European Energy Regulators, the voluntary network of European 
energy regulators, and the country has an obligation to comply with the provisions of the EU energy law. 
I have not included the NRA of Iceland because it is not compelled to adopt the EU legal framework in 
energy. 
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transparency and unbundling, essentially dovetails the British  (and  therefore,  
LME) paradigm, which emerged from the 1980s privatisation and liberalisation 
reforms of UK network industries. This choice, according to Thatcher (2007), 
forced all other Member States to converge towards the LME  model of regulation 
of network industries. Indeed, before the EU began legislating on network 
industries, France and Germany relied on very different arrangements: in France, 
the state owned or controlled most of the sectoral firms and steered sector 
development; in Germany, industrial associations performed self-regulatory 
functions and the state accepted to keep itself at a distance, while retaining a 
monitoring role. Eventually, France and Germany, like all other Member States, 
complied with the requirements of European legislation in formal respects, inter  
alia by setting up regulatory authorities. Closer examination, however, reveals that 
both countries retained the key features of their distinctive mode of coordination in 
the informal networks undergirding the sector at the  national  level  (Thatcher 
2007). Thus, in France, the state preserves a key steering role, while in Germany 
industry continues leading sector development, even though both, at least formally, 
converged to an LME-type sector organisation. 
How does the link between the political economy of a country and its energy 
sector arrangements translate into the transnational arena of regulatory network- 
ing? Does national sector structure affect regulators’ networking choices? I surmise 
that it does: on the one hand, regulators may seek to establish strong connections 
with peers dealing with similarly organised markets, as they are more likely to face 
similar challenges as themselves; on the other, certain national regulators  may 
enjoy more influence than others, prompting their peers to seek them out as  
frequent interlocutors. Since the EU energy legislation is premised on a market 
model corresponding to LMEs, one should expect regulators from LMEs to receive 
more incoming ties as all other Member States slowly converge (or adapt their 
extant mode of coordination in network industries) to the LME mode of 
coordination.2 
In a recent contribution on the European network of broadcasting regulators, 
Papadopoulos (2017) emphasises that regulators learn from peers they hold in high 
esteem and/or who are facing problems perceived as similar, but does not explore 
this pattern any further. In their study of the European network of patent judges, 
Lazega et al. find that “It is clear that judges do sort each other in social networks 
based on their belonging to blocks of countries with similar types of capitalism” 
(2017, 19). The explanation they provide is that judges from similar VoC probably 
refer to similar bodies of law. The fact that nodes prefer to connect to nodes that they 
perceive as being similar to themselves in some theoretically or empirically relevant 
respect (a pattern called “homophily”) has often emerged as having considerable 
explanatory power in studies of social networks (McPherson et al. 2001; Lee et al. 
 
 
2The EU energy legislation mandates the unbundling (or separation) of the network infrastructure, 
consisting of the separation of high voltage/capacity (transmission) and low voltage/capacity (distribution) 
grids from the potentially competitive segments of the electricity and gas sectors, i.e. generation/production 
and supply. Previously, production and investment decisions were made within a single vertically inte- 
grated, usually state-owned energy company. The unbundling of the generation of electricity (and gas 
production) from transmission, distribution and supply is meant to ensure that coordination between 
energy demand, supply and construction of infrastructure happens through market signals (as per the LME 
model). 
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2012; Barberá 2015). Both studies also note that, within networks, certain regulators 
are much more influential than others and are perceived as models by their peers. 
The reason why regulators from countries displaying similar energy sector 
structures are expected to link to peers in similar sector structures is that they are 
likely to encounter the same bottlenecks in the formulation and implementation of 
regulatory policy. At the same time, regulators may seek to establish direct net- 
works with peers overseeing markets that they are converging to, in order to learn 
from their experience and access their expertise, as well as to better foresee 
potential conflicts of interests in their own context. 
My first hypothesis is, therefore, that European energy regulators’ connections 
are governed by a pattern of homophily (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011) driven by 
the similarity in national energy sector structure. 
H1: Regulators network more with regulators overseeing similarly organised 
markets. 
My second hypothesis is that the British regulator should be highly sought after by 
its peers, given that all EU Member States have had to converge, at least partially, 
towards an LME type of energy sector organisation. 
H2:  Regulators  from  LMEs  have  significantly  more   incoming   ties   than   
their peers. 
The literature has frequently pointed to another factor of great importance to 
regulators, as well as to all administrative organisations, which may affect the 
likelihood of tie formation: resources (Glachant et al. 2013). Alcañiz (2010, 2016b) 
finds that sudden budgetary cuts represent a strong incentive for nuclear experts  
and regulators to collaborate with their peers in transnational joint  projects,  in 
order to accomplish their ongoing technical activities. This suggests that less 
resourceful regulators may use informal networking to compensate for  their  
lacking resources and should, therefore, display a tendency to have many outgoing 
ties to their peers. These considerations lead me to formulate my third hypothesis. 
H3: Regulatory authorities with lower  (budgetary  and  human)  resources  are  
more active networkers (i.e. have significantly more outgoing ties than their 
peers). 
This analysis comprises the full population of European national energy regulatory 
authorities, including those from Eastern European Member States. However,  
extant analyses of the link between VoC and regulatory institutions in the EU focus 
on EU-15 Member States (i.e. the Member States of the EU before the 2004 and 
subsequent enlargements). Indeed, the original VoC classification by Hall and Soskice 
(2001) did not include Eastern European countries. Scholars have attempted to 
categorise newer Member States according to existing or new VoC typologies. Feld- 
mann (2006) argues that the Baltic countries are closest to the LME model, and 
Slovenia to the CME model. However, Hancké et al. (2007) underline that the new  
Member States should be considered to be transitioning towards specific models of 
capitalism and cluster them as Emerging Market Economies. Nölke and Vliegenthart 
(2009) label the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic as 
Dependent Market Economies (DMEs), since their type of capitalism development is 
based on the provision of capital through foreign direct investment. 
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Examining the structure of the electricity and gas sectors of different Member 
States (see details in Table 4 in the Online Appendix), however, reveals partial 
discrepancies between even the original VoC classification and the energy sector 
structure of different EU Member States. The most obvious discrepancy concerns 
the case of Ireland, where the electricity and gas sectors are almost entirely under 
government control, thus preventing a categorisation of Ireland as an  LME.  
Overall, a neat distinction exists between countries where the transmission and 
distribution segments are owned and operated by different companies and are 
separate from generation and retail (only the UK) and countries where companies 
active in distribution are also active in retail and sometimes in generation too (as in 
most CMEs). 
In the so-called MMEs, the dominance of formerly state-owned incumbents has 
been restrained through regulation (as in France), mandatory divestment  (as  in 
Italy and Greece) or privatisation (as in Portugal and Spain); still, former 
incumbents have the largest market shares. The energy sector structures of Scan- 
dinavian countries also show commonalities, i.e. a good level of competition in  
both generation and retail (even though state-controlled incumbents are also active 
in those segments), locally owned distribution systems and state-owned trans- 
mission systems. The penetration of foreign capital (mostly from  Western  
European national  companies) in the generation,  distribution and retail segments  
of the electricity sector in several Eastern European countries resonates with their 
classification as DMEs by Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009). Finally, prevalence of 
direct state ownership and control in all segments of the market is evident in other 
Eastern European countries, Cyprus, Malta and, as mentioned, Ireland. 
In sum, the structure and organisation of the electricity and gas sectors across   
the EU Member States show considerable differences in the extent of achieved 
liberalisation and government control. The VoC classification derives from the 
analysis of national political economies and the institutions  underpinning those. 
The concept captures the dominant mode of coordination in the whole political 
economy. Although arguably too general to accurately portray similarities and 
differences across energy sector structures of EU Member States, the VoC fra- 
mework appears to constitute a useful heuristic to categorise different sectoral 
arrangements and, therefore, to capture the different circumstances that national 
regulatory authorities face in their domestic setting. Hence, in the model developed 
in the empirical section, regulatory authorities (as identified by the name of their 
country) are classified as per Table 1. 
Regulators’ ties choices, however, may hardly be choices at all: geography 
plays such a dominant role in energy infrastructure as to potentially overshadow 
any other rationale for informal cooperation, as regulators are bound to 
communicate often with regulators from neighbouring (or, more precisely, 
interconnected) countries. Regular communication with neighbours, in turn, 
may engender stable patterns of exchange of information. In order to assess this 
effect, rather than geographic contiguity, one should consider the actual 
direction of the flows of electricity and gas that are transmitted across borders 
and seas within the EU. Consequently, I include electricity and gas flows, both 
across land and sea, in the analysis, as their directionality may be strongly 
determining regulatory interactions. 
Furthermore, within the context of the EU, exchange of information is man- 
dated by the existence of a common EU energy regulatory framework that national 
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Table 1. Categorisation of European national energy markets 
 
Type of Energy Market Countries 
Liberal Energy Markets (LEMs) The United Kingdom 
Coordinated Energy Markets (CEMs)  Germany, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands 
Dependent Energy Markets (DEMs) Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
 Bulgaria and Romania 
Mixed Energy Markets (MEMs) Italy, France, Greece, Portugal and Spain 
Scandinavian Energy Markets (SEMs) Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark 
Government-controlled Energy Markets (GEMs) Ireland, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
 Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia 
 
 
 
regulators have to implement at the national level. The declared aim of the EU 
energy policy is achieving a fully integrated Internal Energy Market (IEM). As an 
interim step towards the achievement of the IEM, the European Commission has 
launched the so-called Regional Energy Initiatives for electricity and gas. The 
Regional Initiatives group regulators into eight regions for electricity and three for 
gas with the intent of achieving integrated regional markets for both. Frequent 
interaction in the framework of the Regional Initiatives may have engendered 
socialisation dynamics leading to trust and thus to the maintenance of ties beyond 
the official policy framework. I, therefore, include comembership in the Regional 
Initiatives as a proxy for the relevance of European policy requirements to explain 
regulators’ informal ties. 
 
Data and method: an ERGM of strong ties among European energy 
regulators 
The literature on transnational regulatory networks, both European and global, has 
scarcely exploited the power of quantitative network analysis to explain patterns of 
transnational networking. This is plausibly due to lack of data on the connections 
that individual regulators maintain. The contributions that use the tools of network 
analysis usually concern multilevel and multiactor networks of experts around 
specific issue areas, such as the environment, and usually, rely on data concerning 
comembership in cooperation initiatives and/or coattendance of  certain  events.  
The assumed link between comembership and collaboration, however, is not self- 
evident, as actors may be members of the same initiative but not collaborate 
regularly. Very recent contributions in the policy studies literature have resorted to 
asking network members about their regular and frequent ties to other network 
members (Fischer et al. 2017; Hamilton and Lubell 2017) in order to attempt to 
capture the essence of coordination. This analysis adopts a similar approach in 
studying the empirical case of a homogenous network (i.e. comprising one type of 
actor) of transnational scope: the network of ties linking European energy reg- 
ulators, as reported by regulators themselves. 
I gathered the data used in this article between the second half of 2015 and late 
2016. Specifically, I wrote to the Heads of International Affairs departments and to 
Communication Officers of all EU national energy regulatory authorities. Not all 
regulatory authorities have dedicated International Affairs offices, but all have staff 
dedicated to international affairs, such as Communication Officers. I asked these 
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respondents to reply to the following question:3 “Think of the individuals you (or 
somebody at your NRA) exchange information with more often. Which NRAs do 
they belong to?”. Network analysis is very sensitive to missing data; it is important 
to possess information on the whole network in order to make accurate analyses. 
Therefore, I chose to rely on a single question in order to maximise my chances of 
receiving a reply from all network members. Indeed, I have obtained replies from  
all European national energy regulatory authorities, bar one. For that missing 
respondent, I have just considered the nominations of other regulators as 
reciprocated. 
Being aware that the notion of “most frequent” may mean different things 
to different people, and that regular exchanges of information may include 
mostly routine exchanges rather than be occasions for learning, I added to my 
requests an explanatory text specifying to respondents that they should name the 
peers they get in touch with when they seek advice or an exchange of opinions or 
suggestions, not just routine exchanges of information. Moreover, I complemented  
the  question with a request to name the regulatory authorities with which they are 
in contact above and beyond European policy requirements (including 
participation into the ACER). I guaranteed all respondents anonymity of their 
identities and their replies. The resulting network is a “thinned” network (Cranmer 
and Desmarais 2011), 
i.e. a network consisting of only the strong relationships between the nodes. If the 
ties across European regulators were a valued network (with ties having different 
weights depending on their importance), the network studied in this article is one 
of the highly valued ties. I chose to focus on strong ties because energy regulatory 
cooperation in the EU has a long history, dating back since the late 1990s (Vas- 
concelos 2005). Moreover, European energy legislation imposes an obligation on 
European regulators to cooperate within the ACER. Therefore, every European 
energy regulator is connected to all others. I was specifically interested, however, in 
the informal bilateral ties that regulators maintain more regularly and frequently. 
I set up an ERGM of the network of relations among European energy reg- ulators. 
ERGMs represent a technique for inferential network analysis where the outcome 
of interest is a set of relationships (i.e. the ties among the nodes of the network) 
(Cranmer et al. 2017). ERGMs are generative models: the underlying assumption is 
that the observed network structure has emerged from an evolu- tionary process of 
tie formation over time, which can be explained by the com- bination of 
theoretically and empirically relevant variables as well as network dependency 
structures (Robins et al. 2012), such as the tendency for nodes to reciprocate ties, or 
for triangles to be closed (i.e. the property of transitivity, whereby if node i is 
connected to j and j is connected to k, there is a higher probability that i and k are 
also connected). The explanatory variables could be attributes of individual 
nodes or attributes of dyadic ties. ERGMs assess the probability that the observed 
network is drawn from the distribution of the net- work structures that are 
plausible, given the number of nodes and the network density,  and  the  
explanatory  variables.  The  coefficients  of  the  model  are  to be 
interpreted as log odds, as in a logit model. 
 
 
3In half of the cases I obtained regulators’ replies over the phone. Because the question asked during 
phone conversations was identical to those in the email messages, there is no need to account for whether 
regulators responded to the email or were contacted by phone in the models. 
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Figure 1. Visualisation of the network. 
 
The graph in Figure 1 reports the structure of the relations among European 
energy regulators. The network appears characterised by a small number of 
highly connected nodes, a small number of peripheral nodes and a majority of 
nodes having an intermediate number of connections. Figure 1 shows that two 
nodes have not been nominated by any of their colleagues as their most 
frequent contacts (hence have an in-degree of zero). Figure 1 also shows that 
most of the ties are reciprocal, which validates the data, considering that I did 
not set a minimum or a maximum number of nominations for regulators. The 
promise of anonymity concerning respondents’ identities and their replies 
prevents me from assigning labels to all nodes in the graph. 
 
As mentioned, I expect the ties in this network to depend on both exogenous and 
endogenous factors. As for the exogenous factors, the hypotheses I developed in the 
previous section point to homophily, activism and influence, controlling for EU 
policy requirements, interconnection and flows across borders. I include in the 
model several endogenous dependencies to account for likely patterns of social 
interaction that may have contributed to determine the network structure: the 
density of the network; the reciprocity of ties; and the transitivity of ties. I also 
include dependencies to account for the centralisation of the network, i.e. to verify 
whether the network is more centralised around particularly active (i.e. many 
outgoing ties) or particularly influential (i.e. many incoming ties) nodes than 
would be expected by chance. 
Therefore, the predictors employed in the model include electricity4 and gas5 
flows, over land and sea, across EU Member States (plus Norway); comembership 
 
4A matrix reporting electricity flows in both directions across EU Member States in GWh in 2015. Data 
from ENTSO-E website, https://www.entsoe.eu/publications/statistics/electricity-in-europe/Pages/default. 
aspx (accessed 3 November 2017). 
5A matrix reporting gas flows in both directions across EU Member States in cubic meters of gas in 2015. 
Data from UK government website, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ 
data/file/579632/Physical_gas_flows_across_Europe_in_2015.pdf (accessed 3 November 2017). 
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Table 2. Hypotheses, variables and mechanisms 
 
Hypotheses Variable Mechanism 
1 Regulators network more with regulators 
overseeing similarly organised energy 
markets 
Regulators from Liberal Energy Markets 
have significantly more incoming ties 
than their peers 
Regulatory authorities with lower (budgetary 
and human) resources are more active 
networkers (i.e. have significantly more 
outgoing ties than their peers) 
The structure of the network of relationships 
existing among European energy regulators 
corresponds to the paths of electricity and 
gas flows across EU Member States 
The structure of the network of relationships 
existing among European energy regulators 
corresponds to the subdivision operated 
through the Regional Initiatives for Electricity 
and Gas, respectively 
VoC Homophily 
 
2 
 
VoC 
 
More incoming ties 
 
3 
 
Budget 
Staff units 
 
More outgoing ties 
 
Control 1 
 
Electricity 
flows and 
gas flows 
 
Matrix of network ties 
corresponds to 
matrix of electricity 
and gas flows 
Control 2 Regional 
Initiative 
(electricity) 
and Regional 
Initiative 
(gas) 
Matrix of network ties 
corresponds to 
matrix of 
coparticipation in 
EU Regional 
Electricity and/or 
Gas Initiative 
Note: VoC = Varieties of Capitalism. 
 
in the European Regional Initiatives for electricity and for gas;6 data on each 
regulatory authority’s budget and staff numbers;7 and the above-mentioned cate- 
gorisation of their energy sector structure. The quantitative data has been stan- 
dardised before proceeding to the analysis by subtracting the mean and dividing by 
the standard deviation. 
 
Results of the model 
For the sake of clarity, the hypotheses I formulated are listed in Table 2, together 
with the variables describing them and the factors I use as controls for the effect of 
interconnection and coparticipation in EU Regional Initiatives. 
 
The results of the ERGMs are reported in Table 3. I performed the analysis 
using R package “ergm” (Handcock et al. 2017). Coefficients are log odds, 
that is, after exponentiation, they indicate the probability that an edge exists 
between two nodes, all else equal, i.e. conditional on the rest of the graph 
being fixed. Positive and high coefficients indicate higher odds, while 
negative and high coefficients indicate lower odds of a tie existing between 
 
6An affiliation matrix of the Regional Initiatives in electricity and gas. Data from ACER website, http:// 
www.acer.europa.eu/en/electricity/regional_initiatives/pages/default.aspx and http://www.acer.europa.eu/ 
en/gas/regional_%20intiatives/pages/gas-regional-iniciatives.aspx (accessed 3 November 2017). 
7The budget and staff numbers of each the regulatory authority in 2012 (for lack of more recent data). 
Data from the European Commission DG Energy website, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets- 
and-consumers/single-market-progress-report (Country reports 2014, accessed on 3 November 2017, 
complemented with regulatory authorities’ annual reports in some cases). 
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Table 3. Exponential Random Graph Models of the network of European energy regulators 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Network density − 4.865 (0.376)*** − 5.494 (0.496)*** − 5.477 (0.519)*** − 6.015 (0.576)*** − 5.135 (0.451)*** 
Homophily according to Variety of Capitalism 
Coordinated Market 
Economies 
Dependent Market 
Economies 
Government 
ownership Mixed 
Market 
Economies 
Nordic Market 
Economies 
1.252 (0.484)***   1.178 (0.569)**   1.167 (0.593)** 1.143 (0.564)* 1.177 (0.553)** 
0.744 (0.319)** 1.670 (0.514)*** 1.836 (0.577)*** 2.250 (0.605)*** 1.168 (0.440)*** 
0.577 (0.257)**   0.800 (0.402)**  0.841 (0.444)* 0.928 (0.479)* 0.536 (0.360) 
0.586 (0.394) 0.416 (0.507) 0.397 (0.512) 0.452 (0.560) 0.911 (0.470)* 
1.494 (0.801)* 1.508 (0.918) 1.583 (0.917)* 1.625 (0.949) 1.448 (0.843)* 
Varieties of Capitalism and incoming ties 
Coordinated Market 
Economies 
0.980 (0.462)** 0.977 (0.483)** 1.106 (0.502)** 
Dependent Market 
Economies 
Reference 
category 
Reference 
category 
Reference 
category 
Government 
ownership 
Liberal Market 
Economies 
Mixed Market 
Economies 
Nordic Market 
Economies 
Effect of resources on outgoing ties 
0.654 (0.475) 0.635 (0.498) 0.667 (0.518) 
1.989 (0.517)***  1.871 (0.610)*** 1.863 (0.615)*** 
0.993 (0.460)**  0.958 (0.492)* 0.974 (0.494)** 
0.895 (0.492)* 0.883 (0.510)* 0.942 (0.523)* 
Staff (2013) − 0.144 (0.188) 
Budget (2013) 0.197 (0.172) 0.261 (0.143)* 
Staff size (full-time equivalents, 2016): 
Large (>170) Reference 
category 
Medium (90–140) 0.978 (0.353)*** 
Medium-small 
(50–75) 
− 0.173 (0.506) 
Small (12–50) 0.750 (0.473) 
Micro (>12) − 0.173 (0.690) 
Varieties of Capitalism and outgoing ties 
Coordinated Market 
Economies Dependent 
Market 
Economies 
Government 
ownership 
Liberal Market 
Economies 
Mixed Market 
Economies 
Nordic Market 
Economies 
Controls 
 
 
0.522 (0.415) 
 
Reference 
category 
0.465 (0.434) 
1.416 (0.492)*** 
0.059 (0.458) 
0.464 (0.469) 
Comembership in 
Regional 
Initiatives for 
electricity 
Comembership in 
Regional 
Initiatives for gas 
Cross-border 
electricity flows 
Cross-border gas 
flows 
0.361 (0.172)** 0.550 (0.196)*** 0.578 (0.204)*** 0.685 (0.219)*** 0.501 (0.192)*** 
 
 
0.154 (0.238) 0.130 (0.246) 0.101 (0.251) − 0.092 (0.276) 0.106 (0.247) 
 
0.627 (0.191)*** 0.576 (0.188)*** 0.580 (0.197)*** 0.580 (0.181)*** 0.588 (0.171)*** 
0.052 (0.097) 0.016 (0.096) 0.013 (0.095) 0.085 (0.102) 0.035 (0.105) 
Endogenous dependencies 
Reciprocity 1.967 (0.394)*** 1.956 (0.383)*** 1.899 (0.393)*** 1.801 (0.396)*** 1.905 (0.383)*** 
Activity 3.022 (1.487)**  2.263 (1.468) 2.360 (1.451) 4.099 (2.126)* 2.800 (1.623)* 
Popularity − 0.187 (0.830) − 0.158 (0.914) − 0.209 (0.886) − 0.418 (0.928) − 0.336 (0.866) 
Shared partners 0.051 (0.031) 0.061 (0.036)* 0.067 (0.037)* 0.077 (0.036)** 0.053 (0.028)* 
Transitivity 1.073 (0.218)*** 0.932 (0.223)*** 0.908 (0.232)*** 0.880 (0.235)*** 1.008 (0.234)*** 
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Table 3. Continued 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Akaike information 494.559 489.868 492.298 483.653 496.646 
criterion      
Bayesian information 565.052 583.858 595.687 601.840 590.636 
criterion      
Note:*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
 
two regulators on the basis of the given parameter. Each explanatory factor 
was fed into the model  according  to  its  expected  effect8  on  the  odds  of 
tie existence. 
Table 3 offers two main takeaways: first, all else equal, regulators do display a 
tendency to maintain close relationships with peers who oversee similarly struc- 
tured markets, particularly in the case of regulators from Dependent Energy  
Markets and from Coordinated Energy Markets; second, the British regulator is 
more likely to be at the receiving end of a tie than its peers, all else equal. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, therefore, are confirmed. The homophily pattern could not be 
tested in the case of the UK and its liberal market model because it is unique in the 
data set, hence cannot form homophilous ties. Overall, all regulators are sig- 
nificantly more likely to receive ties than regulators from energy markets that are 
dependent on foreign investment (i.e. DEMs, the reference category in the models), 
bar regulators from countries where the electricity and gas sectors are mostly under 
public ownership and control. 
In model 3, budgetary and staff resources are operationalised via a con- 
tinuous predictor (referring to the year 2013) and appear not to significantly 
affect the odds of tie existence. To shed more light on the matter, in  model 4 I  
use more recent, categorical data on staff figures released by ACER.9 All else 
equal, regulators with medium staff numbers (i.e. 90–140 full-time equivalent 
employees) are more likely to be  active networkers. Higher budgetary figures  
are also associated with higher odds of outgoing ties, but the effect is rather  
weak. These results run partially contrary to Hypothesis 3: regulators with low 
staff numbers do not tend to send significantly more outgoing ties than reg- 
ulators with different staff numbers, all else equal. However, the model suggests 
that regulators with intermediate staff numbers are significantly more likely to 
 
8The syntax of ERG Models comprises a wealth of terms. The ones used in this model are outlined here 
below: 
∙ “edgecov”: the input is a matrix of covariates; a positive coefficient indicates the probability that two 
nodes sharing the same characteristic are also ties (e.g. are part to the same Regional grouping); 
∙ “nodeicov”: it tests whether a certain attribute of the node affects its in-degree (e.g. more resources 
are associated with significantly higher odds of incoming ties); 
∙ “nodeocov”: same as nodeicov, but for out-degree; 
∙ “nodeifactor”: same as nodeicov, but for categorical variables; 
∙ “nodeofactor”: same as nodeocov, but for categorical variables; 
∙ “nodematch”: it tests for homophily, i.e. the probability that two nodes that match on the given 
characteristic (e.g. two regulators who are both from Western European countries) share a tie; 
∙ “absdiff”: similar to nodematch but for continuous covariates. 
9Categorical data on staff figures by regulatory authorities referring to 2016 on the ACER website, 
https://goo.gl/ZzDtZP (accessed 1 April 2018). I combined the “Large” and “Medium Large” categories. 
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have more outgoing ties even compared to authorities with large numbers of  
staff. This effect may be the manifestation of a compensatory strategy. Given 
that variables associated with regulators’ resources do not fully explain reg- 
ulators’ outgoing ties, in model 5 I examine whether sector structure is asso- 
ciated with a higher likelihood of being active networkers. Once again, the 
British regulator appears, all else equal, more likely to have more outgoing ties 
than its peers. 
Furthermore, the results for endogenous dependencies show that ties are very 
likely to be reciprocated. The coefficient on the dependency called “shared part- 
ners” should be read in conjunction with transitivity. Shared partners indicate the 
tendency for the nodes in the network to have connections in common, whether  
they are connected or not. Transitivity  indicates  whether two regulators that share  
a strong tie are also more likely to have shared partners than would be expected by 
chance. Hence, in this network, there is a tendency to have connections in com- 
mon, which becomes significantly stronger when two regulators are connected. In 
other words, if two regulators have a connection in common, they have higher   
odds of being connected by a strong tie, as well. Finally, there are signs that the 
network is centralised on nodes having high out-degree, i.e. having many outgoing 
ties, while the parameter for centralisation of the network around highly influential 
nodes, although positive, fails to achieve significance. This means that regulators 
cluster around active nodes, but not around influential ones, and suggests that 
regulators use active nodes to increase their access to information, including their 
access to influential nodes. 
As for the other predictors, the models show that regulators that are members of 
the same Regional Initiative for Electricity are more likely to be connected and that 
the direction of the electricity flows across the EU mirrors the directionality of ties 
across regulators. Gas Regional Initiatives and gas flows never achieve significance. 
Nevertheless, these effects do not suffice to explain the network structure, which 
appears even more strongly determined by energy sector structure. The coefficients 
of the ERGM should be interpreted as log odds of the probability of a tie existing, 
given the feature investigated. In the network described by model 2, the probability 
of a tie existing (equivalent to the intercept in a regression) is 0.4%. If there is a 
mutual tie, the probability becomes 17%. If two nodes are both from what I defined 
as Coordinated Energy Markets (i.e. from Coordinated Market Economies), the 
probability jumps to 40%. 
I run additional ERGMs in order to check for the possibility that the extent of 
market liberalisation in each country is the actual explanatory factor for tie 
homophily and individual regulators’ influence. I operationalised market liberal- 
isation using two different measures: first, by using the market share of the largest 
electricity generator in each country (Eurostat data10); second,  I used  OECD data 
on network industries regulation (Koske et al. 2015) concerning the extent of 
government ownership in the largest firm active in each of the segments of  both  
the electricity and gas sectors: generation (production or import for gas), trans- 
mission, distribution and supply (see Tables 5 and 6 in the Online Appendix for  
data and models results). None of these variables appears to significantly affect the 
odds of tie formation; except for the variable indicating government ownership of 
 
10Eurostat energy statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/main-tables (accessed 1 April 
2018). 
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the largest distribution system operators. This variable shows a significant negative 
coefficient, which should be interpreted as corroborating the results, emerging in 
other models, regarding regulators overseeing energy sectors under government 
direct control. The extent  of  market  liberalisation  upstream  and  downstream  
(i.e. generation and retail) does not, however, appear to hold explanatory power for 
regulators’ network ties. 
Finally, I rerun the main model (i.e. model 2) using a different categorisation, 
whereby regulators from Member States that entered the EU in 2004,11 200712 and 
2013 (Croatia) are clustered as a single “Other” category. Merging the two cate- 
gories of Dependent Energy Markets and government-controlled ones has  the  
effect of showing the divide between EU-15 and newer Member States even more 
starkly. However, it prevents an appreciation of the homophily patterns across EU-
15 regulators themselves, as the “Other” category outnumbers all other cate- gories: 
the model results simply confirm that regulators from newer Member States are 
significantly more likely to network with each  other  than  with  the  rest  of their 
peers and that EU-15 regulators are much more likely to receive incoming ties than 
their peers from the “Other” category (results available upon request to the author). 
 
Model fit 
The ERGM defines a probability distribution across all networks of the size of the 
network in the model. If the model is a good fit for the observed data, then  
networks drawn from this distribution are likely to resemble the observed data. As 
mentioned, ERGMs are generative models. They represent the process of tie for- 
mation from a local perspective. These locally generated processes eventually 
produce network properties, even if those are not specified in the model. One way  
to assess the fit of a model, then, is to examine how well it reproduces network 
properties that are not in it. To assess model fit, I compare the value of several 
network statistics between the observed network and simulated networks; these are 
edge-wise shared partner distribution, minimum geodesic distance, in-degree and 
out-degree. The four plots emerging from the simulation from Model 2 (the 
preferred model) are reported in Figure 2. Model 2 appears able to capture network 
structure considerably well, given its parsimonious setup and clarity. The  dark 
lines, corresponding to observed values, fall in the boxplots (simulated values) for 
nearly all configurations. 
 
Discussion of the results 
Two main findings emerge from this analysis. First, regulators appear more likely  
to maintain connections with regulators who oversee similarly organised electricity 
markets; this is particularly the case for regulators from what I defined Coordi- 
nated, Nordic and Dependent Energy Markets. Second, and simultaneously, the 
regulator from the only LME in the data set (the UK) has much higher odds of 
receiving ties, given its peripheral geographic location, than its peers. Given that  
the whole EU energy regulatory framework and relevant legislation are based on an 
 
11Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
12Bulgaria and Romania. 
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Figure 2. Goodness of fit of model 2: in-degree, out-degree, edge-wise shared partners, minimum geodesic 
distance. 
 
LME-type mode of coordination, this finding can cautiously be interpreted as a 
manifestation of regulatory convergence. The combination of these two patterns 
appears to support Thatcher’s (2007) analysis, which diagnosed convergence of 
other VoC towards the LME model, at least in network industries, but at the same 
time noted the persistence of extant modes of coordination. Regulators from Mixed 
Energy Markets, where formerly state-owned incumbent retain the bulk of the 
market share but coexist with smaller new entrants, are the least likely to be 
homophilous in their tie choices; this suggests that regulators from these econo- 
mies are not significantly more likely to maintain frequent ties to peers from their 
same political economy, but rather have a wider range of regular contacts. 
Although the coefficients in model 2 are higher for regulators from coordinated 
and liberal energy markets, all regulators appear significantly more likely to receive 
incoming ties than regulators in the reference category  (DEMs), bar  regulators 
from countries where government ownership and control across the whole energy 
sector is prevalent. These two categories of regulators, for the most part, belong to 
newer Member States, which entered the EU after 2004. In short, the models show 
that, as far as transnational energy regulatory networking is concerned, there is a 
divide between regulators from EU-15 and regulators from newer Member States. 
The coefficients for endogenous dependencies indicate that reciprocity is common 
in this network, indicating bonding and reciprocal trust among European energy 
regulators (Berardo and Scholz 2010). Transitivity is also a property of this network, 
as is relatively common in information exchange networks (Fischer et al. 2017). 
Moreover, the model shows that some regulators are more active  than others, i.e. 
have more outgoing ties, causing the network to be centralised on out- degree, even 
though the coefficient is not always significant across models. These active nodes 
are plausibly bridging across the network (Berardo and Scholz 2010), 
which would otherwise comprise some isolated nodes. 
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Overall, the analysis of this network structure appears to tell a story of policy 
learning driven by expertise as well as by commonality in sector structure and 
therefore, as per my hypotheses, common challenges. The approach I adopted in 
developing the model is very conservative: I included several endogenous depen- 
dencies to account for ties that exist because of structural properties of the network, 
rather than homophily; I also included common  membership  in  European 
Regional Initiatives and electricity and gas cross-border flows in order to test the 
strength of regulators’ associations against a powerful constraint for network 
industries, as geography. Furthermore, coordination and collaboration between 
European energy regulators have a long history, dating from the late 1990s, and are 
embedded in a very developed and well-formed supranational legislative and 
regulatory framework. These features show in the network structure, which is 
overall dense and comprises a single component. 
Indeed, that any effect is visible beyond those controls is telling of the strength  
of the national political economy of the sector as a driver of regulatory networking. 
As regulators are placed at the interface between their national markets and the 
European dimension, they build their informal bilateral ties according to both 
homophily and, arguably, convergence. Interestingly, the British regulator also 
emerges as significantly more active than its peers in model 5, all else equal. This 
finding resonates with Thatcher’s (2007) remark that British politicians have often 
complained of the slow progress of liberalisation reforms in the other Member 
States. In truth, the British regulatory authority has repeatedly expressed concern 
over the effect that the lower extent of liberalisation in other European markets   
may have on British consumers and underlined its leading role in the network of 
European regulators in virtually all of its annual reports to the European Com- 
mission, released since 2007.13 
Model 2 is preferred for its parsimony. Indeed, evidence regarding the impor- 
tance of resources for explaining network ties is less than conclusive, even though 
suggestive of interesting patterns. Using categorical instead of continuous data for 
staff figures, which splits regulators into groups according to the number of their 
full-time equivalent staff, avoids the collinearity driven by the very high numbers of 
staff of the British regulatory authority. Results show that regulators with inter- 
mediate numbers of staff are most likely to be active networkers, which suggests 
that regulators with small numbers of staff are somehow unable to cultivate an 
extended network and that regulators with large numbers of staff are not sig- 
nificantly more likely to have a higher number of ties compared to counterparts. I 
run other models which indicate homophily among regulators with large numbers 
of staff (i.e. >170), i.e. regulators with large numbers of staff tend to network with 
each  other.  It bears pointing  out  that,  perhaps  surprisingly,  regulatory authorities 
with large numbers of staff are not necessarily those from bigger Member States; 
that subgroup comprises regulators from the UK and Germany, but also from 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. The energy regulatory authority of a large  
country like France has between 40 and 90 full-time equivalent staff units, ending 
up in the medium group. In this case, the impact of resources on the likelihood of  
tie existence is difficult to discern clearly. 
 
 
13Annual Reports of National Regulatory Authorities can be downloaded at https://www.ceer.eu/eer_- 
publications/national_reports (accessed 1 April 2018). 
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The literature has found that very often policy networks display a core-  
periphery pattern (Knoke 1990; Carpenter et al. 2003), whereby there is a cohesive 
core of densely connected nodes and a periphery whose members are poorly 
connected both to the core and among themselves. The intuitive conception of core-
periphery structures entails a dense, cohesive core and a sparse, unconnected 
periphery. Core-periphery structures have been investigated in the literature on 
networks (Borgatti and Everett 2000) as well as in the literature on the European 
Union (Magone et al. 2016). In the context of the EU, the same concept has been 
applied to frame relations between “old” and “new” Member States (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012). 
Finally, the irrelevance of gas in explaining the patterns of European energy 
regulators’ networking is a puzzling result of the analysis. Neither gas flows, nor 
gas regional initiatives appear to have statistical or substantive significance with 
regard to this network. This may be due to the lower control regulators have in the 
gas sector and the development of gas markets compared to electricity. 
 
Conclusions 
The main question this article sought to answer concerned the drivers of informal 
regulatory networking at the transnational level. I examined the empirical case of 
European National Energy Regulatory Authorities, tasked with regulating the 
electricity and gas sectors within their national borders and simultaneously asked   
to coordinate in order to bring about regulatory harmonisation and foster market 
integration across the EU. Far from being straightforward, this task is ridden with 
difficulties and setbacks given, as the relevant literature has often discussed, that  
the Member States have different administrative, legal and institutional traditions. 
This analysis shows that faced with these differences, national regulators capitalise 
on the similarities between the markets and sectors they oversee in order to fulfil 
their tasks. 
Differences in the structure of the sector are likely and have been shown in this 
article, to be equally important in affecting regulators’ networking practices, as they 
seek to fulfil the tasks bestowed upon them. 
I hypothesised that regulators would tend to choose counterparts embedded in 
similarly organised markets as their most frequent and stable network partners. I 
operationalised this concept by relying on data on the main stakeholders active in 
the different segments of the electricity and gas markets at the national level, their 
number and the extent of government ownership of them. I categorised regulators 
into separate groups by relying on the VoC framework as a heuristic device to 
conceptualise the specificities of the electricity and gas sectors in the countries 
considered. I also hypothesised that regulators from LMEs (in this context, the UK) 
would receive significantly more ties, since the European energy regulatory policy 
and legislation are shaped according to that mode of coordination. Finally, I 
expected resources to also matter for regulators’ networking choices, as less 
resourceful regulators may seek to fill their informational gaps by linking to more 
resourceful ones. 
The results confirm that similarity of sector structure is, indeed, a powerful 
driver of regulators’ tie choices for most categories of regulators. The hypothesis 
concerning the influence of a liberal market model is also confirmed and can be 
interpreted as a sign of ongoing convergence, on the background, however, of 
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persisting dynamics of coordination typical of national political economies, as  
found in Thatcher (2007). The hypothesised link between lower resources and 
higher network activism failed to clearly emerge from the analysis: however, 
medium-sized regulatory authorities do appear more likely to be active  compared  
to their more or less endowed counterparts. Moreover, higher budgets are asso- 
ciated with more outgoing ties, suggesting that more resourceful regulators have, 
indeed, more resources to devote to networking. 
The endogenous network dependencies indicate that ties in this network tend to 
be reciprocal; the effect for this dependency is very strong, representing an impor- 
tant validation of the data, as I did not specify a minimum or a maximum number of 
nominations to the respondents. Moreover, regulators tend to close triangles, par- 
ticularly when two nodes are already connected; this testifies to the importance of 
information exchange relationships in fostering trust among the actors involved. The 
observed network structure features a handful of regulators having considerably 
more outgoing ties than their peers; to account for this, I included in the model 
dependencies accounting for network centralisation around active networkers. The 
effect is strong, but not consistently significant. The presence of particularly active 
networkers is, however, important to facilitate exchange among different nodes in 
the network, particularly those with fewer regular connections. 
Overall, regulators from newer EU Member States (i.e. those who entered from 
2004 onwards) appear less integrated into the network structure, suggesting a core- 
periphery pattern. Regulators from Dependent Energy Markets appear as the most 
strongly homophilous and the least likely to receive incoming ties. Regulators from 
countries where government ownership and control across all sector segments pre- 
dominate also emerge as less likely to receive ties than their peers. The presence of 
scarcely connected nodes in this dense network of regulators suggests that forms of 
structured cooperation, such as the ACER, are probably necessary in order to achieve 
regulatory coordination across the EU. Structured cooperation impedes the forma- 
tion of cliques or disconnected communities of regulatory authorities, and 
encourages learning and exchange also across widely different institutional contexts. 
The purpose of the analysis was grasping the invisible and undocumented 
drivers of transnational networking; this entails the important limitation of the 
impossibility of triangulating data with other sources of information. This concern 
is assuaged by the practitioner knowledge of the persons who kindly agreed, under 
the promise of anonymity, to respond to my inquiry. Further research may seek to 
study network evolution over time by relying on longitudinal data, as this may help 
capturing the engines of phenomena, only cautiously alluded to here, such as 
convergence (or lack thereof). 
The models in this article are cross-sectional; therefore, they do not allow for a 
full appreciation of regulators’ “historical” ties, i.e. whether their connections fol- 
lowed a path dependent evolution. ERGMs are premised on the notion that the 
observed network structure emerged as a result of a gradual process of network 
formation determined by the processes that the model itself attempts to capture. 
Hence, the results of this model suggest that homophily, influence, reciprocity and 
transitivity are essential properties of this network. For one, this suggests the 
copresence of bonding and bridging social capital (Berardo and Scholz 2010); in 
other words, regulators’ ties are driven both by reciprocal trust and by informa- 
tional needs. Further study of the process of network evolution and change over 
20 Francesca P. Vantaggiato 
 
time, however, is necessary in order to capture the fine-grained mechanisms of long-
standing regulatory collaboration. 
Supplementary materials. To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/ 
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